Risk Pricing for the Reusable Falcon 9

In my last post I explored how the SpaceX's reusable Falcon 9 (rF9) could threaten those companies offering suborbital launch services.  

Discussion has focused on the risks preventing the rF9 from reaching the optimistic breakeven price point of $130 per kg (discussed in my last post).  Here are a few of the risk categories you have raised:

• Increased variable costs: Elon may claim only $200K of propellant per flight, but the variable costs of an rF9 flight will surely be higher
• Reduced number of flights: When you factor in the complexities of reusing a launch vehicle and the potential for a crash or loss of vehicle
• Reduced payload capacity: Adding reusability will increase the mass of non-payload components – reducing the payload mass

What rF9 breakeven price points might we expect if we take these concerns into account?  In the table below, I explore these risks and their impact on breakeven price per flight and breakeven price per kg.  

In the second column are the breakeven prices today for an expendable Falcon 9.  This is the upper end of cost.  Weight any of these risks to the point you get price points beyond $5K per KG and customers will prefer the current Falcon 9 over the reusable version.  The third column shows the optimistic assumptions from my last post.  Columns four through six:

• Increase variable cost per mission from $200K to $2M
• Reduce reusability from 47 missions per vehicle down to only 10 missions per launch vehicle
• Reduce payload capacity by 50% from 10,450KG to 5,225KG

These risk values give us a range we can talk about.  Even variable costs of $2M per flight, only 10 flights per vehicle, and half of the payload mass consumed with reusability hardware, SpaceX should be able to reach breakeven price points of about $1500 per KG and $7.5M per flight. 

And the great thing about risks…they get retired.  Be as pessimistic as you want to be about the capabilities of the initial versions of the rF9.  Variable costs will drop over time.  Flight rates per vehicle will rise, and payload mass will creep back up.  The key has been (and will always be) flight rates.  I wouldn't be surprised to see SpaceX subsidize their first generation rF9, offering first generation customers prices SpaceX won’t be able to satisfy profitability until the second generation rF9 – all in the name of increased flight rates.

How optimistic or pessimistic are you about rF9 capabilities?  Here is an interactive spreadsheet for you to explore your own risks and their effects on breakeven prices.    

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

With SpaceX’s announcement this week that the company would not only develop a reusable first stage for its Falcon 9 family of rockets but would make a completely reusable rocket system (I will use Clark Lindsey’s nomenclature: "rF9" for reusable Falcon 9), I have been wondering about the future of the young NewSpace companies developing reusable suborbital rockets.  Will companies like Masten, Armadillo and to a lesser extent XCOR and Virgin Galactic, survive this incursion from a well-funded NewSpace Cousin?

(the youtube video via Clark Lindsey's youtube channel.)  

SpaceX has announced the company is developing the “Grasshopper,” a 100 foot-tall suborbital Falcon 9 first stage that SpaceX’s cadre of young, talented engineers will use to test this initial piece of the rF9.  SpaceX has NOT announced any intention to commercialize the Grasshopper.  But if Masten, XCOR, and Armadillo continue to delay bringing a product to market that can reach 100KM, and SpaceX continues to develop products in its typical rapid fashion, might customers ask to buy payload space on an upcoming Grasshopper test?  

Or would SpaceX be willing to sell Grasshoppers to operators who then provide a suborbital launch service to users using the Grasshopper all before Masten has reached 100KM?  Could the unmanned Grasshopper be modified to carry passengers and compete with Virgin and XCOR?  If an operator came with funding, wouldn’t SpaceX take their money to make the modifications to "manrate" Grasshopper?

But the big money is the orbital market.  Most of the suborbital companies have expressed interest in using their suborbital experience and even their suborbital vehicles to expand current offerings to include an orbital system.  XCOR has published this image of an orbital capability.  

Virgin Galactic even took investment money from the Middle East to jump start their orbital program.  Could an rF9 meet all market demand for both suborbital and ultimately orbital launches as well?  And if they do, are the current suborbital companies doomed? 

It all comes down to money.

How cheaply could SpaceX really launch their new rF9?  We don’t know.  SpaceX does not even know yet.  But we can make some interesting estimates.   The heart of these projected orbital price reductions stems from reusing the rF9 like Southwest reuses its 747’s (which can fly commercially for 30 years with proper maintenance).  How many reuses is SpaceX planning on? 

At this point, the best data I have is a nugget SpaceX's CEO, Elon Musk, said this last week that he is targeting $500K trips to Mars as a market for his reusable craft.  

Let’s make some assumptions so we can approximate SpaceX’s reusability assumptions:

1. A price for a Dragon/Falcon 9 trip to Mars will be equal to the price SpaceX is currently charging NASA for ISS visits ($130M per trip) - optimistic assumption
2. 5 paying passengers per Mars Trip - optimistic assumption
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between-flight costs are included in the launch price - optimistic assumption

SpaceX breaks even after 47 flights (but that is a lot of assumptions).  here is a table to help visualize the math:

 Assuming a 47-flight amortization, what could be SpaceX’s breakeven price per KG to LEO?  Or to say it another way, how low would the suborbital company’s prices have to be to beat SpaceX?  

Again, let’s make some assumptions:

1. A price for an rF9 to LEO is the same as current LEO Falcon 9
2. Falcon 9 payload to LEO is unchanged
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between flight costs are included in the launch price.
5. Propellant Cost per Launch = $200K
6. rF9 breaks even after 47 flights

Based on these assumptions, SpaceX's breakeven Price to LEO for rF9 is $130 per KG or ~$1.4M per flight.  Again, here is a table to summarize how I came to this conclusion.  At the end of this post is a link to an interactive spreadsheet where you can modify these assumptions to create your own analysis.

These SpaceX prices are surely the most optimistic for the near term:

1. What if the rF9 doesn’t get 47 flights per vehicle?
2. What if between-flight maintenance costs for the rF9 are significant?
3. What if payload capacity has to be significantly reduced to accommodate rF9’s reusability elements?
4. What if near term launch demand is not high enough to fly as often as they need?

Even with the identified risks, this analysis would indicate:

• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for suborbital market share (especially if SpaceX sells the Grasshoppers to entrepreneur operators)
• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for orbital market share through extraordinarily low prices

So how can XCOR and Masten compete?  

I continue to be bullish regarding the utility of Nanosat-class launch vehicles.  When suborbital companies start offering orbital services (a second generation service), their initial orbital offerings would probably be within this Nanosat class - broadly speaking, payload space significantly under 100kg.  Is there still a market for suborbital companies to offer this type of orbital service?  Even if SpaceX may be able to now match (or beat) them on price?  

Yes.  Here is why:

Sometimes smaller is better.  The smaller vehicles these suborbital companies will eventually offer on orbit should:

• Be easier to "fly full"– to get the $130/KG price on an rF9, you have to wait for the manifest to fill.  Not so with a smaller vehicle.  XCOR was talking about a payload of 12-20KG initially.
• Be easier (and cost less) to maintain.
• Be launched with less integration or preparation – this advantage is the BIG one.  XCOR talks about multiple flights on the same day, taking off and landing from existing airports.  Even if the rF9 could launch that often, it will be some time before regulations allow SpaceX to fly that often - especially if they are still flying from the Cape or Vandenberg where ops tempo is measured in "launches per month" not "launches per day".

Nanosat launchers are the future, but only if their ops tempo is fast enough to justify paying a premium for preferential launch windows.  

This advantage of the small won’t last forever.  SpaceX will keep improving its initial RLV offerings.  Spaceport operations will grow to allow for more airline-like ops tempos.  So Nanosat launch operators (today’s suborbital companies) will have to keep improving too.

But there is a market for Nanosats and it hinges now on ops tempo.  There is hope.

The bigger worry…

…is in the near term.  I mentioned earlier, I doubt SpaceX will pursue commercializing their Grasshopper suborbital vehicle.  But they may be open to selling this suborbital vehicle for others to operate.  Such a suborbital operator flying the Grasshopper would have tremendous suborbital market advantages and could be a major competitor to those suborbital companies focusing on suborbital research (Masten, Armadillo, etc.).

Suborbital companies should be worried, but not panicking.  If the reusable Falcon 9 hastens the development of viable Nanosat launchers, the industry will be doubly blessed – low launch costs from the rF9 and high ops tempo from Nanosat launchers.

Here is the interactive spreadsheet so you can build your own rF9 assumptions.

Business Case for a CubeSat-based Earth Imaging Constellation

The use of Commercial Earth Imaging Satellites is growing. Individuals, corporations and governments are finding varied and unique applications for images of our planet.

Futron estimates the market for commercial earth imaging topped $1B last year (2010).


Uses of Earth Imaging:

• Disaster Relief – think of all of the satellite images you saw after the Japan Earthquake (including the nuclear reactors)
• Disaster avoidance - George Clooney (among others) paying to patrol boarder of north and south Sudan using Earth imaging satellites.
• Helped with hunting down Osama bin Laden (but were any these images from commercial satellites?)
• Food Commodities tracking – allowing traders to ask and answer questions like, “how do the wheat crops in Kansas look after last night’s hail storm?”
• Remote Infrastructure observation – the oil industry uses it to keep track of their assets in remote locations
• Even the US Government is turning to Commercial providers. Last year, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) awarded separate 10-year, $3.5 Billion contracts to image providers DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (these contracts are now under review).

The Commercial earth observation markets:

1. Market #1: High-Resolution images (1.5 meters per pixel). But the cost of each satellite means providers have a limited number of satellites (usually 1-2) on orbit.
2. Market #2: Med-Resolution images (5-7 meters per pixel) – lower quality images, but providers tend to have more satellites in orbit and may offer more spectral bands to choose from for each image and offer more frequent photo opportunities due to the higher number of satellites within the constellation.

In a recent Nov 2010 paper, “6U CubeSat design for Earth observation with 6.5m GSD, five spectral bands and 14Mbps downlink,” author, Dr. Steven Tsitas outlines how a constellation of 6U CubeSats could serve Market #2 (frequent med-res images) competitively. (Sorry, I think you will have to buy the paper. If a reader finds a free version of the paper online, let me know and I will change the link). I hope to post an interview with Steven Tsitas soon.

But why even consider a CubeSat at all for such a mission? Here are just a few of the advantageous of using CubeSats:

• High amount of innovation in the field – from NASA, universities, and private industry
• Low ITAR restrictions (CubeSat programs are thriving in many nations)
• Low mass of each satellite
• Reduced launch cost per satellite
• Reduced cost to replace/upgrade constellation as satellites age, breakdown, or new technology becomes available

Rapid Eye, a German company, is the current leader serving Market #2. Below I will provide some details about Rapid Eye and how a CubeSat constellation might be able to compete with Rapid Eye.  First, a little education about Rapid Eye.

Rapid Eye Details:

• Five identical sun-synchronous Earth observation satellites
• Five spectral bands
• Launched in August 2008
• Satellites built by Surrey UK
• 650KM circular orbit
• Captures 4mil km squared of earth’s surface every day
• Once an order is placed for an image, can take a photo of any location on earth (between 75 degrees N and 75 degrees S) within 24 hours.
• Offers not only images, but offers services for the analysis of images – especially good at providing comparative analysis of images taken over a period of time

Rapid Eye, the Numbers:

• Customer price for images: $1.33 per square KM (must purchase 5,000 KM at a time (at current Euro conversation rates that is equal to $6650 per very large image)
• Satellite Constellation construction: $35M 
• Expected 2009 Revenue: $29.5M (have not confirmed this number)
• Total Capital needed to break even: $224M

Assumptions about Rapid Eye’s business:

• Assumed Rapid Eye is now profitable
• Assumed the cost of the single Dnepr launch necessary to lift the five Rapid Eye sats: $15M
• Assumed a $50M infrastructure Hardware purchase (ground station and other startup infrastructure)
• Assumed a five year startup at a cost of ~$25M per year in operating (non-HW, non-infrastructure costs)

So what if we could launch a constellation of ten cubesats that could perform a very similar function as Rapid Eye’s current constellation of five small sats? Are their savings if we could? For this post, I will use Steven Tsitas’s conclusions that, yes, such a cubesat constellation would be technically possible.

I will build my business case, not from a technology discussion, but by attempting to answer the business question of - how much could an business save by using Cubesats instead of small sats?

CubeSat Venture Assumptions:

• Cost per 6U CubeSat: $400,000
• Number of CubeSats in constellation: 10
• 6U CubeSat mass: 8 lbs each
• Falcon 1 launch: $9.8M
• SpaceX willing to prorate launch cost based on mass

If we assume the CubeSat venture would operate using the same Hardware and Operating Costs as the Rapid Eye venture, then the CubeSat savings are limited to the cost of the satellites themselves and the cost to launch them into orbit:

• Rapid Eye’s satellite and launch costs: 23% of breakeven costs
• CubeSat venture’s satellite and launch costs: 3% of breakeven costs

This would mean a CubeSat venture competing with Rapid Eye could theoretically lower image prices by twenty percentage points over competitors (all other things being equal). This by itself may close the business case for some CubeSat constellation investors.

But perhaps competing toe-to-toe with Rapid Eye is the wrong business model. As a general rule, it is hard to out Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart. What-if the CubeSat earth imaging venture could, instead, become the low-price, no frills, earth imaging provider?

In the earlier example, the CubeSat advantage was limited to lower satellite costs and cheaper rides to orbit on SpaceX launch vehicles. But what-if the venture could also save money on ground costs: Hardware/ground stations and operating expenses?

CubeSats, the low-cost leader in earth imaging Assumptions:

• Continue with assumptions regarding low satellite costs
• Continue with assumptions regarding low launch costs
• Lower ground Hardware and Infrastructure costs from $50M to $25M
• Lower operating costs from $25M to $10M per year.

Here is a quick cost comparison between the options:


















Next Questions (beyond the scope of this post):

• Market price elasticity: How price sensitive is the earth imaging market? How would cutting Rapid Eye’s price by 20-60% affect demand for a CubeSat-based image product?
• What realistic cost reduction methods are possible in ground hardware and personnel?
• Admittedly, my Rapid Eye information was limited to publicly available data, a more serious effort should be conducted to understand the competitor’s cost structures and current profit forecasts
• What are the cost implications from using a CubeSat-based system? Where are system costs reduced? Where are system costs increased?
• Admittedly, images from a CubeSat are of a lower quality than the best in orbit (5-7 meters per pixel compared to 1.5 meters per pixel from the industry leaders of market #1).  How sensitive is the market to image quality?  And what can be done to increase the quality of an image taken on a 6U CubeSat?

NLV Market Analysis

Garvey's Prospector 7C

In October of 2004, I attended the Space Frontier Foundation’s conference in Southern California on the Queen Mary. There, Masten Space Systems made a big splash announcing it was joining Armadillo Aerospace in developing Suborbital RLV’s.

I remember thinking at the time, how did Masten have enough market data to make that decision? Masten, Armadillo, XCOR, Virgin, Blue Origin – these guys & gals threw their hat in the ring long before there were significant studies confirming suborbital RLV’s made “market sense”. They had vision. They had guts. Or if the data did exist, at the time, I did not know how to find it.

And now, NASA is offering a prize for a Nano-satellite Launch Vehicle (NLV) – “launching very small things quite often”. And as candidate NLV teams consider throwing their hats in this ring, the market data is a little more available for an NLV service than there was for suborbital service almost a decade ago.

This post attempts to consolidate that NLV market analysis. Of course this will be incomplete, so I need your help. Add links to other NLV market data in the comments of this post to benefit the whole group. I will skip a discussion of NASA's NLV Challenge.  Here is NASA's NLV Challenge Page  for more details. 
I have broken the NLV market analysis down into the following categories:

• NLV Market Sources
• Market Overview
• NLV Market Differentiators 
• NLV Substitutes
• Interesting NLV Market Nuggets
• Potential Market Competitors
• Market Demand Graph
• NLV Pricing Discussion
• Market Impactors

NLV Market Sources.  The authors of these study deserve your business. Buy their papers. They are doing good work. Instead of at the end of this post, I wanted these links near the top!

• Foust, J. 2010. “Emerging Opportunities for Low-Cost Small Satellites in Civil and Commercial Space”
• Foust, J. 2008. “If you Build It, Who will Come? Identifying Markets for Low-Cost Small Satellites”
• Christensen, I, et al. 2010. “Market Characterization: Launch of Very-Small and Nano Sized Payloads Enabled By New Launch Vehicles.” This link will give you the first few pages, have to buy the full version.

Market Overview.  The NLV market can be dissected in at least two ways: (1) by payload size and (2) by payload type.

Payload Size. I have heard various naming conventions for small payload launch vehicles.  For this blog post, I will use “Nano”, “Micro”, “Small” as three payload sizes to consider.  However, I will group them all together and use the name NLV most of the time.

• Nano - Under 10kg
• Micro - 10-100 kg
• Small - 100-200 kg

NASA is focused on a 1kg payload for its NLV Challenge. The Army is interested in at least 20kg payloads. Even if first generation vehicles are only able to launch a few kg of payload, commercial NLV ventures would be wise to endeavor to grow to larger payload sizes over time. Current 200-400kg payloads launched currently on larger vehicles would surely be interested in "going on a diet" if an NLV launcher could carry 100-200Kg yet offer more frequent launches.

Payload Type. The second NLV market subdivision will be the option of (1) launching a functioning satellite or (2) delivering cargo to stations or depots. Of the two, cargo delivery may very well be the larger of the two sub-markets. It will take far less preparation to send the ISS an NLV-load of fresh apples than it would be to fund, develop, integrate, and launch a nanosat. Both satellite launches and cargo delivery will be sub-markets. Expect the satellite market to retain a diversified customer base. Expect the cargo delivery customer base to be dominated by station owners in the early days (ISS partners and Bigelow), but to expand to Space Station customers in the not so distant future (see: NanoRacks).

NLV Market Differentiators.  What makes an NLV unique? An NLV won’t be able to carry as much payload to orbit as its bigger cousins, why would any customers want to use an NLV?  Answer: Frequent launches, low integration time.

• Cost: Higher Cost per LB than larger launchers but lower Cost per launch
• Launch Frequency: Launch *much* more frequently than larger launchers (weekly? Daily?)
• Launch Lead Time: Integrate payloads in less time to take advantage of more frequent launches
• Payload Mass: a few kg (at first)
• Orbit Choice: Customers can choose since not a secondary payload
• Suborbit/LEO/GEO: Limited to LEO (at first) – Suborbital applications? Maybe.

NLV Substitutes.  Prices for NLV’s cannot be set independent of substitutes. Here’s a list of some big ones:

• Launch as secondary payload. Spaceflight Services (Andrews Space) offers a turnkey solution for your payload to fly on the BIG rockets as a secondary payload.
• Hosted payloads. Boeing just launched a new service to combine your payload with others on a single satellite bus thus reducing customer costs since they do not need to procure an entire satellite. Note: this would be a substitute only for satellite payloads, not for cargo payloads
• Commercial RLV suborbital spaceflight. Masten, Armadillo, and Blue Origin are stuck at 100km for now, but not for long. Watch as future generations of their vehicles climb higher and higher giving customers a greater flight-time, frequent launches, and very low costs.
• With COTS deliveries to ISS approaching, deliveries to station will be made by NASA several times per year with ISS partners also delivering cargo to station several times per year.

Interesting NLV Market Nuggets.

• Microcosm Inc, identified potential market-wide launch savings of more than $15B over a 12-year period, resulting from the development of a low-cost responsive launch vehicle focused on the SmallSat market (above 100Kg)
• In a 2008 presentation, Pete Worden said there were ~80 universities with active cubesat (nanosat) programs 
• A 2006 Futron Study identified over 30 markets in 6 principle areas for services provided by low-cost satellites in the 100-200 kilogram class
• The US Army is interested in Nano Launch and had put a price point of $1M per launch.
• My interview with the CEO of CubeSat component manufacturer Clyde Space revealed he thought $250K for a 3u is definitely too much for most customers.
• My interview with Professor Jordi Puig-Suari from Cal Poly and professors from MIT, and St. Louis University who are currently active in either university satellite development or active in space research of some kind show they are targeting a price point under $50K per CubeSat with $20K being preferred. Relooking at my notes from those interviews, at a $20K price point, these professors thought the US demand for CubeSat launches would grow to 50-100 each year. Interesting they thought the low flight opps of the current “secondary payload” system a bigger problem than the high cost. Prof Michael Swartwout said in my interview with him, he waits 5-7 years to secure a spot on a rocket to launch his CubeSats. This is longer than an undergrads college career – not too inspiring for young engineers!

Potential Market Competitors.  Non-exhaustive – From the Paper: "Market Characterization: Launch of Very-Small and Nano Sized Payloads" by Christsensen, et all. 2010.

Market Demand Graph:

This graph is incomplete but should convey the significant number of different areas where an NLV could gain market share. For an explanation of these categories I would encourage you to get a copy of the wonderful papers I list under the “sources” section of this post.

NLV Pricing Discussion.  A major portion of any market analysis is not just what the needs are but what are potential customers willing to pay to meet those needs. For the NLV market you have customers at different ends of a spectrum. Government customers like the Army have stated a willingness to pay $1M to place 20kg in LEO. Universities want to keep Cubesat costs (usually 1-3 kg) to under $20K per U.

Variable Pricing seems like the right answer, where Primary customers pay a premium to fly on their schedule to their orbit and others willing to fly “standby” get a much reduced price but operate on someone else’s schedule and flies to someone else’s orbit. Rather than rewrite the variable pricing details now, here is the post I wrote on variable NLV pricing a few months ago.

If you made me guess right now, I would assume the following prices per U would be acceptable by the market:

• Government: $50-200K per U (with discounts per U for larger payloads)
• Academia: $20K per U
• Commercial: ???, perhaps somewhere between

Market Impactors.  Any market has externalities to the market that can help or hurt the industry. Here are just a few:

• Of all of the substitutes available to the NLV market, the one that has most potential to steal market share is the second or third generation of suborbital RLV’s. As mentioned earlier in this post, a subset of the NLV market could be served with the extended micro-gravity offered by suborbital RLV’s flying to 500 or 1000 km. But the opposite is also true, a delay or accident affecting the un-manned portion of the suborbital RLV industry (primarily Masten, Armadillo, and Blue Origin) could make some customers consider launching on an NLV rather than waiting for the suborbital ride. 
• One of the two key sub-markets for NLV’s will be package delivery. More successful space stations, more package delivery. The proliferation of commercial space stations will be a major driver of this sub-market
• How the last mile problem gets solved will directly affect the viability of micro package delivery (one of my two submarkets). We need solutions for the last mile problem – the solution will be part technology, part policy, part management. If NLV packages can’t be routinely delivered to space stations, the NLV industry will be severely hampered and space stations will miss out on an enabling method to gain just-in-time deliveries.
• NLV’s only work as a market if they can launch frequently with low integration turnarounds. Even if low costs had to come later, the ability to launch frequently with streamlined payload integration will be the driving force behind early NLV success stories. The question operators will need to ask is, “How do I design and manage NLV operations in such a way to achieve the goals of frequent flight opps and low integration turnarounds?”
• Although depot development is still years down the road, the potential “match made in heaven” between depots need for frequent propellant deliveries and NLV’s ability to fly frequently should not be overlooked…but I would not build a business plan around depot assumptions just yet.

That is a good dataset to start.  I will add some commentary in future posts.  Here is the spreadsheet containing the tables used in this post. 

Now I welcome your additions.  Use the comments section to your links to even more NLV market data.

Variable Pricing for a NanoSat Launcher

From a recent post about NanoSat Launch Vehicles, a commenter asked some good questions about NLV pricing.

Paraphrasing and summarizing, he asks how a NanoSat Launch Vehicle operator could achieve a low price point ($500-$1M) while still making the price attractive to universities which are often funded from small $10-20K grants. He also asks about how in this same post, I derive a desired NLV price point from between $500K and $1M. My response is below.

I believe the following business model could be effective at both increasing demand for a NanoSat Launcher and earning significant revenue for each flight. The model can be summed up in two themes:

1. Offer frequent, well-published launch opportunities
2. Provide variable pricing

Frequent, well-published launch opportunities increase demand by giving customers the ability to fly as often as they desire. Variable pricing charges your customers what they are willing/able to pay while still giving you, the launch operator, a business model capable of making money long-term.

Without frequent, well-published launch opportunities and variable pricing, your capacity to launch will dwarf the current demand making long-term profitability illusory.

Launch monthly (weekly if you can) per a schedule posted online. Regulations will probably limit your flight rate more than your technical solution, so focus resources on minimizing regulatory delays. I envision online payload reservation for customer convenience with orbit targets for each launch clearly posted. Sub-divide your cargo space into 1kg/1u modules (1u= one 10cm cubed space. This is CubeSat language). Sell Three products to your customers:

• Standby Payloads are priced low enough to attract University customers but such "standby" payloads may get bumped from a particular flight if a customer willing to pay “guaranteed” rates is available. University customers on standby will not be choosing the orbit in which their CubeSat is deposited, but since most of these payloads are for education purposes, the loss of orbit selection is more than offset by the combination of frequent launch opportunities and ridiculously low cost. 
• Guaranteed Payloads are priced at a premium attracting customers willing to pay for the frequent on-time flight opportunities. 
• Allow one customer per flight to choose the orbit (altitude/inclination) for a price. I would assume that the first customer reserving Guaranteed Payload Space on a given launch would also secure the orbit that best met the need of their payload.

$1.5M per flight.  If the launcher’s payload bays were full, the revenue per flight might look like this (arbitrary pricing):

$1.1M per flight.  If the launcher’s payload bays were less than full, revenue could still be more than $1M per flight (again arbitrary pricing values). Payloads are only at 60% in the example below:

$515K per flight.  Depending on the cost structure of the NanoSat Launch provider, they could even launch a single 3u P-Pod for about $550K. Would some customer’s find value at that price if they launched when they wanted, to the orbit they wanted? Under such circumstances, you may consider filling your unused payload space with non-paying education payloads.

The commenter also wanted to know why I thought $500K-$1M price point makes sense for single 20kg payload? As we have seen above, through innovative pricing, aggregate price points per launch could be considerably higher while still offering bargains to the universities to help keep your manifest full. But below was my logic for why I thought $500K to $1M was a safe range:

1. The US Army is interested in Nano Launch and had put a price point of $1M per launch.
2. My interview with the CEO of CubeSat component manufacturer Clyde Space revealed he thought $250K for a 3u is definitely too much for most customers.
3. My interview with Professor Jordi Puig-Suari from Cal Poly and professors from MIT, and St. Louis University who are currently active in either university satellite development or active in space research of some kind show they are targeting a price point under $50K per CubeSat with $20K being preferred.  Relooking at my notes from those interviews, at a $20K price point, these professors thought the US demand for CubeSat launches would grow to 50-100 each year. Interesting they thought the low flight opps of the current “secondary payload” system a bigger problem than the high cost. Prof Michael Swartwout said in my interview with him, he waits 5-7 years to secure a spot on a rocket to launch his CubeSats. This is longer than an undergrads college career – not too inspiring for young engineers!
4. $500K price point would cover launching 20 CubeSats at $25K each (even if you were not swayed by my variable pricing strategy).
5. $1M price point would represent the Army’s desire for a nano launch capability that I mentioned under #1